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The current study investigated the impact of worry and brooding asmoderators of the tripar-
tite model of depression and anxiety (TMDA).We hypothesized that both types of persever-
ative thinking would moderate the association between negative affectivity (NA) and both
anxiety and depression. Complete data sets for this questionnaire survey were obtained
from 537 students. Participants’ ages ranged from 16 to 49 years with a mean age of
21.1 years (SD= 3.6). Overall, results from path analyses supported the assumptions of the
TMDA, in that NAwas a non-specific predictor for both depression and anxietywhilst lack of
positive affectivity (PA) was related to depression only. Unexpectedly, perseverative think-
ing had an effect on the dependency of negative and positive affectivity.Worry was a signifi-
cant moderator for the path NA–anxiety. All other hypothesized associationswere onlymar-
ginally significant. Alternative pathways as well as methodological implications regarding
similarities and differences of the two types of perseverative thinking are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
About two-thirds of depressed individuals also meet the crite-
ria for an anxiety disorder (Judd and Burrows, 1992). Clark and
Watson’s tripartite model of depression and anxiety (TMDA) is
an affective model that aims to explain both the comorbidity
and differentiation of depression and anxiety symptoms (Clark
and Watson, 1991). In this model, anxiety and depression symp-
toms share a non-specific component that encompasses general
affective distress (negative affectivity, NA). The syndromes can
be distinguished by physiological hyperarousal (PH) on the one
hand, which is assumed to be specific for anxiety, and the relative
absence of positive affectivity (PA) on the other hand, believed
to be specific for depression. The model is both descriptive and
prospective by explicating patterns of affectivity that predispose
individuals to develop the respective disorders.
The TMDAhas generally received good empirical support,with
the strongest evidence coming from factor analytic studies across
a variety of populations, for example child, undergraduate, com-
munity, and clinical samples (Watson et al., 1995; Joiner, 1996;
Joiner et al., 1996; Lonigan et al., 2003; Tully et al., 2009). Never-
theless, there are also reports on inconsistencies and limitations of
the model. For instance, the proposed specific role of low PA or
anhedonia for the development of depressive symptoms is ques-
tionable as low PA is a factor in depression but also in some forms
of anxiety, i.e., social phobia (Shankman and Klein, 2003).
Clark and Beck’s cognitive content specificity hypothesis –
a product of Beck’s cognitive theory – states that automatic
thoughts or cognitive content should be related to emotional states
(Beck, 1976; Clark et al., 1989). Following this view, anxious and
depressive symptoms can be differentiated by unique cognitive
Abbreviations: NA, negative affectivity; PA, positive affectivity; PH, physiological
hyperarousal; TMDA, tripartite model of depression and anxiety.
contents. In a meta-analytic review, Beck and Perkins (2001) eval-
uated the evidence for this hypothesis. They argued that – given
the degree of shared variance between depression and anxiety
constructs – the convergent symptomatology/cognition relation-
ships should be stronger than the divergent ones. This was true
for specific depressive contents across studies, while anxious cog-
nitive content shared equal variance with depressive and anx-
ious symptomatology. Also, in 5 out of the 13 studies included
in the meta-analysis, anxious and depressive cognitive content
was stronger interrelated than anxious and depressive symptoms,
which weakens the hypothesis further. It can be argued that there
are no cognitions that are truly specific to all anxiety disor-
ders, emphasizing the problem of the heterogeneity of anxiety
disorders.
Taken together, these results suggest that cognitive content
alone might not be sufficient to explain depression and anxiety
symptomatology. Rather, the way individuals engage in automatic
cognitions may also be important for the two syndromes. For
example, perseverative thinking in the form of depressive rumina-
tion and anxious worry has been shown to be related to depression
and anxiety symptomatology, respectively. Depressive rumina-
tion has been defined as passively and repetitively focusing on
symptoms of distress and the circumstances surrounding those
symptoms, and can be understood as a stable emotional response
style (Just and Alloy, 1997; Bagby et al., 2004). Rumination has
been shown to intensify depressed mood, predict the onset, recur-
rence, severity, and duration of depressive episodes as well as
suicidal ideation. It interferes with problem solving, leads to more
pessimistic future perspectives and less social support (Morrow
andNolen-Hoeksema, 1990;Nolen-Hoeksema andMorrow,1991;
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema and
Davis, 1999; Bagby et al., 2004; Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema,
2007).
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There is growing evidence that at least two forms of rumination
with distinct effects on depression can be distinguished: brooding
and reflection. Brooding or passively dwelling on symptoms of
distress has been found to be the key factor in the prediction of
depressive symptoms. Self-reflection or actively attempting to gain
insight into problems, on the other hand, is not related to any
negative outcomes (Treynor et al., 2003; Burwell and Shirk, 2007;
Moberly and Watkins, 2008). Therefore, studies on the detrimen-
tal effects of rumination should rely preferably on the brooding
dimension of the construct.
Rumination and its maladaptive subtype brooding share com-
mon elements with worry, another form of perseverative thinking.
Worry can be defined as“repetitive, uncontrollable thoughts about
potential negative life events” (Segerstrom et al., 2000). It is a car-
dinal feature of general anxiety disorder (GAD) which is often
co-morbid with depression (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). The perseverative nature of both rumination and worry
entails a similarity between these two constructs, whilst the con-
tent of them appears to differ with rumination being past oriented
and worry being future oriented (Papageorgiou andWells, 2004).
Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the specificity of the two
constructs in the literature. Most studies investigating persevera-
tive thinking link rumination specifically to depression, and worry
to anxiety. Far fewer studies have investigated the contribution of
both forms of perseverative thinking to both syndromes (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Fresco et al., 2002; Garnefski et al., 2002; Sarin
et al., 2005). Segerstrom et al. (2000), for example, found that
repetitive thought was related to both anxiety and depression;
specific forms of repetitive thinking such as worry and rumina-
tion, however, did not predict anxiety or depression by themselves.
Given these findings, perseverative thinking might be especially
relevant for mixed depression/anxiety symptoms. To our knowl-
edge, the role of perseverative thinking within the TMDA has not
been investigated yet.
For the present study we used a sample of adults that were
slightly younger than the average age at onset of Major Depres-
siveDisorder (AmericanPsychiatricAssociation,2000). The aim in
doing sowas to investigate the prospective properties of the TMDA
for individuals that are at an at-risk age for the development of this
disorder.
We hypothesize that both depressive brooding and anxious
worry moderate the associations as predicted by the TMDA,
by strengthening the associations between NA, and anxiety and
depression (Figure 1).We hypothesize further that there will be no
specific contribution of either brooding or worry asmoderators of
the TMDA, as we assume that themoderating properties of brood-
ing and worry are due to the higher-order factor perseverative
thinking.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
For this questionnaire survey, 537 (477 female) undergraduate
students were recruited from the student population of a British
University. Complete data sets were obtained from 508 students.
Participants’ age ranged from 16 to 49 years with a mean age of
21.1 years (SD= 3.6). Most of the student volunteers indicated
being British (64.7%), followed by Indian (7.8%), other European
(4.7%),Caribbean (3.5%), Irish (2.1%), and other (3.9%). Seventy
FIGURE 1 | Hypothesized model. Brooding andWorry moderate the paths
between negative affectivity and both depression and anxiety.
students (13.6%) did not indicate their ethnic background. Stu-
dents were recruited from non-psychology courses in order to
avoid confounding effects due to familiarity with the topics inves-
tigated. Ethical approval was obtained from the University’s ethics
board.
MEASURES
The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS, trait version;Wat-
son et al., 1988) provides a brief, reliable, valid, and stable measure
of trait affectivity. This questionnaire is the standard instrument
for measuring trait affect as proposed in the TMDA and has been
developed with and applied on undergraduate student samples. It
consists of 20 items, half of which measure positive and negative
affect, respectively.
The disposition to engage in brooding responses to sad mood
was assessed using a revised version of the Ruminative Response
Scale (RRS) of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ). For
this scale, items of the original RRS that were contaminated with
depressive symptoms were omitted. The revised RRS consists of
10 items and loads on two factors: brooding and reflection. Partic-
ipants indicated how they generally react when in a depressed
mood with a range from 0 (never) to 3 (always). The revised
version is a reliable and valid measure of both the brooding
and reflective subtype of depressive rumination, as was shown
in investigations with healthy and clinical populations of all age
groups including student samples (Kasch et al., 2001;Treynor et al.,
2003). For this study, only the brooding dimension was used for
analysis.
Anxious worry was assessed using the Penn State Worry Ques-
tionnaire (PSWQ, trait version;Meyer et al., 1990) which has been
extensively applied and validated. The PSWQ has shown good
reliability in student samples (Fresco et al., 2003).
Depressive symptoms
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D;
Radloff, 1977) is a standardized and extensively used instrument
to measure depression in the general population. It is the most
commonly used instrument in depression research with young
adult samples. The scale consists of 20 items and has been exten-
sively validated. The psychometric properties have been shown to
be satisfactory.
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Table 1 | Means, SD, range, and reliability for all measures.
PA NA Brooding PSWQ BAI CES-D
n 523 523 532 518 497 510
Mean/SD 3.50 (0.57) 2.09 (0.64) 1.30 (0.66) 3.21 (0.88) 1.56 (0.50) 0.83 (0.55)
Total score 35.01 20.94 6.49 51.32 32.79 16.58
Range 13–49 17–80 0–15 17–80 21–74 0–55
Cronbach’s α 0.830 0.835 0.782 0.929 0.923 0.908
Table 2 | Zero-order correlations between variables.
NA Brooding PSWQ BAI CES-D
PA –0.181** –0.148** –0.192** –0.171** –0.355**
NA 0.491** 0.426** 0.471** 0.474**
Brooding 0.526** 0.513** 0.566**
PSWQ 0.485** 0.532**
BAI 0.661**
**p<0.001.
Anxiety symptoms
Beck’s anxiety inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988) was origi-
nally developed for the assessment of clinical anxiety, but has
been shown to be the superior instrument for anxiety assess-
ment in non-clinical undergraduate samples as well (Creamer
et al., 1995). The 21-item scale has high internal consis-
tency and high discriminant validity to depression in student
samples.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
For all scales, total sums were computed and used for analysis. To
test the proposed causal relationships (Figure 1) between PA/NA
and the TMDA dimensions, path analyses were conducted (Kline,
2005). To assessmoderating effects of brooding andworrywe used
multigroup analyses.Multigroup analyses allow for the assessment
of the question whether specific path coefficients, a group of path
coefficients, or all path coefficients of a path model simultane-
ously differ between groups. We divided each of the two scales
for brooding and worry into two groups based on a median split.
The pathmodel was thus analyzed for high/low brooding rumina-
tors and high/low worriers in order to detect moderating effects of
perseverative thinking for specific path coefficients and for all path
coefficients simultaneously. PA and NA were exogenous variables
in this model, anxiety and depression symptoms were endogenous
variables.
Preliminary analyses were conducted excluding data frommale
participants (11%) and compared with results from the whole
sample. There were no differences in anxiety or depression scores
between men and women, nor did the results of the path analyses
differ when excludingmen from those includingmen and women.
Results are, therefore, reported for the entire sample. Scales were
transformed (log, square root) if necessary to meet regression
analysis assumptions.
All analyses were conducted using the software package
AMOS 18.
RESULTS
Means, SDs, ranges, and scale reliabilities of allmeasures are shown
in Table 1. As the path model was just identified, no fit statis-
tics are shown. Zero-order correlations between all variables are
shown in Table 2. All variables were significantly interrelated,
with p-values below 0.01 for all measures (n= 506). Persevera-
tive thinking was more closely related to NA than to PA (e.g.,
brooding–NA: r= 0.491; brooding–PA: r =−0.148). Depression
and anxiety symptoms were highly related (r = 0.661). Both kinds
of perseverative thinking had strong associations with depression
as well as with anxiety (e.g., PSWQ–CES-D: r = 0.532).
PATH ANALYSES
Overall model
All four coefficients significantly differed from zero although
the coefficient PA–BAI was the least significant (β=−0.093,
p= 0.019). The other three coefficients had absolute β-values
between 0.28 and 0.45 and p-values of <0.001 each. The correla-
tion between PA and NA was r =−0.18 (p< 0.001). Anxiety and
depression symptoms were strongly related (r = 0.57, p< 0.001).
Subgroups worry low/high
Taken together, the four path coefficients significantly differed
between the two subgroups (p= 0.016). This was primarily due
to the coefficient NA–anxiety symptoms, which was strongly and
significantly increased in the “high worry” subgroup compared to
the “low worry” subgroup (p< 0.001, constraining the three other
coefficients to be equal between subgroups), whereas the other
three coefficients did not differ between subgroups (p> 0.40 for
each coefficient). Note that when using three instead of two sub-
groups (low, medium, and high worry), results for the coefficient
NA–anxiety symptoms were similar with the highest coefficients
for the “high worry” and the lowest coefficients for the “low
worry” subgroup, suggesting a linear association. The correlations
between NA and PA were r =−0.02 (p= 0.75) and r =−0.25
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FIGURE 2 | Path- and correlation coefficients in low (high)
worry-groups. Numbers of the high worry group are in italics in the lower
lines. The numbers in parentheses are SEs of path coefficients.
FIGURE 3 | Path- and correlation coefficients in low (high) brooding
groups. Numbers of the high brooding group are in italics in the lower
lines. The numbers in parentheses are SEs of path coefficients.
(p= 0.001) for low and high worry, respectively. For the subgroup
“low worry,” all but one coefficient significantly differed from 0
(absolute β between 0.30 and 0.38, p< 0.001) with the excep-
tion of the path PA–BAI (β=−0.10, p= 0.084). The correlation
between BAI and CES-D was 0.59 (p< 0.001). For the subgroup
“high worry,” all but one coefficient significantly differed from 0
(absolute β between 0.27 and 0.44, p< 0.001), the exception was
PA–BAI (β=−0.05, p= 0.44). The correlation between BAI and
CES-D was 0.50 (p< 0.001; Figure 2).
Subgroups RSQ brooding low/high
For both groups, all path coefficients differed significantly from
zero with the exception of PA–BAI in the high brooding group
(β=−0.03, p= 0.65). Considered together, the four path coef-
ficients did not differ significantly between the two subgroups
(p= 0.084). In addition, none of the four coefficients differed
between the two subgroups, although the path coefficient NA–
anxiety was 0.41 for the high versus 0.30 for the low brooding
group (p> 0.05 for each coefficient, constraining the three other
coefficients to be equal between subgroups). The relationship
between PA and NA was stronger in the high brooding group
(brooding low: r =−0.05, p= 0.36; brooding high: r =−0.27,
p< 0.001; Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
Themain aim of the present study was to investigate the impact of
brooding and worry as moderators of the association between NA
anddepression and anxiety in a sample of young adults. The results
support the assumptions of the TMDA, in that NA predicted
both anxiety and depressive symptoms. Low PA also significantly
predictedboth anxiety anddepression,but the associationbetween
low PA and anxiety was negligible, thus confirming the proposed
specific role of low PA for depression.
Results regarding the moderating role of brooding and worry
weremixed.Although both types of perseverative thinkingmoder-
ated the associations betweenNA and both anxiety and depression
in the hypothesized direction, this was statistically significant for
worry only. As hypothesized,worrymoderated the predicted asso-
ciation by strengthening the pathNA–anxiety. The hypothesis that
both kinds of perseverative thinking moderate both paths NA–
depression/NA–anxiety symptoms, therefore, received only partial
support. Nevertheless, even though brooding was not a significant
path moderator, it still had a strong tendency to strengthen the
association between NA and anxiety. Neither worry nor brood-
ing had a significant impact on the path NA–depression. While
worry was a significant specific path moderator, brooding mod-
erated both paths NA–worry and NA–depression only marginally.
In the present study, worry had a specific and strong effect, while
the moderating effect of brooding was non-specific and weak.
Segerstrom et al. (2000) found a stronger non-specific effect in
non-depressed students,while specific associations between rumi-
nation and depression were found in patients only. It could be
argued that the general proneness to perseverative thinking is a
predisposing factor for both anxiety and depression, which may
develop into the respective clinical syndromes when filled with
specific content. This notion is also supported by the high inter-
correlations between brooding, worry, anxiety, and depression in
our non-clinical sample. In the future, it should be investigated
whether interventions to reduce perseverative thinking would be
effective for the prevention of both disorders. However, in indi-
viduals with clinical depression or anxiety, it could be useful to
target rumination and worry specifically. Even though the impact
of perseverative thinking in the present path model was mixed,
zero-order correlations between worry, brooding, depression, and
anxiety were high. This suggests that there may be other pathways
that connect perseverative thinking with depression and anxi-
ety. There is preliminary evidence that higher-order cognitions
like beliefs about rumination and worry may explain associations
between perseverative thinking and psychopathology. In their
review, Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) argue that in addition to
content and process, negative beliefs about worry and rumination
link perseverative thinking with psychopathology. This approach
should be followed up in future research.
In individuals reporting high levels of perseverative think-
ing there was a significant negative association between NA and
PA. Unexpectedly, in participants with low levels of persevera-
tive thinking no such association was found. To our knowledge,
there is no literature on the impact of brooding and worry on
the association of NA and PA. Diener and Emmons (1984) found
the association between NA and PA to depend on the time frame
assessed: when measuring momentary affect, PA and NA were
inversely related. This association diminished linearly when longer
intervals were evaluated. In another study (Johnson et al., 2008),
only students with bipolar disorder ruminated in response to
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positive affect compared to students with unipolar depression or
students with no disorder. It is possible, therefore, that the ten-
dency to ruminate or worry predominantly leads most individuals
to exacerbate their negative affect only. FollowingDiener’s findings
(1984) that it does not seem possible to experience positive and
negative affect at the same time, one could apply this result to peo-
ple who experience negative affect for longer periods. People with
high levels of rumination have prolonged periods of negative affect
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Lyubomirsky and Tkach, 2004). During
these prolonged periods, it is unlikely for these individuals to expe-
rience positive affective states. This way, the negative association
between NA and PA in participants with high levels of persever-
ative thinking might occur. Another explanation could be that
worriers’ and ruminators’ access to the recall of their general affect
could be biased and influence the PANAS scores toward the more
negative (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky
et al., 1998). In order to obtain more valid data, these processes
should be investigated with ecologically momentary assessment
methods.
LIMITATIONS
There could bemethodological reasons for the ratherweakmoder-
ating properties of brooding on the associations between NA and
anxiety/depression. One concern lies in the definition of rumina-
tion and, therefore, the wording of the brooding items of the RSQ.
Thoughts assessed by the RSQ focus on the content of the respec-
tive cognition but not on their perseverative nature. Although the
internal consistency and predictive validity of the RSQ for depres-
sion have been demonstrated, there are no data on the construct
validity of the brooding subscale. In the present study, the sub-
scale had the lowest internal consistency of all measures employed
(see Table 1). Similar problems were reported by Johnson et al.
(2008) who found no association between the brooding subscale
of the RSQ and depression scores in participants without mood
disorders. For future research, instruments that reliably assess the
perseverative aspect of depressive rumination are needed. Simi-
larly, when comparing definitions of rumination and worry, there
are differences regarding the controllability of the two. The dimen-
sion of uncontrollability is a defining criterion for worry but
not brooding, and it might be beneficial for future research to
emphasize the aspect of uncontrollability for brooding as well.
Papageorgiou andWells (1999), for example, report that inpatients
with major depressive disorder and panic disorder, rumination
was rated longer in duration, and less controllable than worrying.
Watkins et al. (2005) found that rumination and worry share the
same processes although different content. Sharpening the defin-
ition of rumination in a way that the aspects of uncontrollability
or perseveration are emphasized would contribute to improving
instruments assessing brooding.
Another limitation regarding the external validity of the present
results lies in the sample investigated. To capture factors underly-
ing depression and anxiety we focusedmostly on young adults that
were younger than the average ages of onset for anxiety (25 years)
and depression (30–40 years, American Psychiatric Association,
2000). The results are relevant from the clinical perspective of
a higher prevalence of these disorders in young adults but may
not apply to older individuals or clinical samples. There is some
evidence that the mechanisms linking perseverative thinking and
mood or anxiety disorders differ between student populations
and clinical samples. In clinical samples, the specific associa-
tions between rumination and depression seem much stronger
(Segerstromet al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2008). If thiswas confirmed
in future research, specific implications for prevention and inter-
vention could be drawn. For the prevention of anxiety and depres-
sion, the reduction of general perseverative thinking might be a
useful target. For the intervention of clinical depression and anx-
iety, brooding and worry should be targeted specifically. Another
potential limitation was the skewed gender ratio. To address this
issue, we conducted all analyses for the female sample only, with
no impact on the results.
CONCLUSION
The double role of perseverative thinking, i.e., specific and general,
should attract more attention in future investigations. The present
result that brooding had a stronger moderating impact on the
path NA–anxiety than on the path NA–depression emphasizes this
point. The current findings suggest that the assumption of the cog-
nitive content specificity hypothesis should be extended. It is not
only the contents of automatic cognitions that have detrimental
effects on mental health but also the perseverative nature of these
cognitions. More research in this area could have implications for
the prevention and treatment of anxiety and depression.
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